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We examine the welfare effects of price limits and trading halts in a linear
mean-variance model of stock and futures trading. We suppose that shocks to
liquidity and fundamentals occur between the time investors decide to trade
and the time their orders are executed and cannot be insured with contingent
claims. This gives rise to implementation risk that is not transferred optimally
among investors. Price limits (or price contingent trading halts) serve to
partially insure implementation risk.'
We show that when price fluctuations are due solely to news about fun-
damentals, judiciously chosen price limits are (ex ante) pareto superior to
unconstrained trade. When liquidity shocks are large, then some speculators
lose, but hedgers still benefit from price limits.
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The large decline in stock and stock index futures markets on October 19 and 20, 1987,
and a smaller, but equally startling, decline two years later have fueled cries that financial
markets have become too volatile. One solution to problems evoked by periods of extreme
volatility, proposed originally by the Brady Commission and later reiterated by the Working
Group on Financial Markets, is coordinated "circuit breakers." Circuit breaker mechanisms,
as envisaged by the Brady Commission, "cushion the impact of market movements, which
would otherwise damage market infrastructure. They protect markets and investors."' Stock
and futures exchanges have adopted several types of circuit breakers on an experimental basis;
among them are price limits and trading halts.2
Free market advocates question how regulations that impede price adjustment can im-
prove market performance, especially in asset markets, which are thought to be highly com-
petitive. They argue that price limits and trading halts prevent mutually advantageous
trades that would occur voluntarily and that limited or "stale" prices fail to convey infor-
mation to investors. As a result, they feel circuit breakers can only make investors worse
off.
These arguments are not compelling. While circuit breakers do prevent mutually advan-
tageous trades, it does not follow that investors are better off without them. In fact, history
suggests the opposite might be true. Futures exchanges have long employed daily price lim-
its to constrain commodity futures price movements. The New York Stock Exchange hires
specialists, who limit price movements by absorbing the difference between external supply
and demand, to "maintain price continuity." To the extent that these exchanges serve the
interests of their investing clientele, it would seem that investors prefer limited trade over
unconstrained trade.3
Despite this long history of self regulation, current advocates of stronger circuit breakers
have only recently confronted the inefficiency arguments of their opponents.4 The usual
'Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, January 1988, p. 66.
2
Price limits are upper and lower bounds placed on price movements over some specified period of time.
Trading halts prohibit trade for some specified period of time after the price has moved some specified
amount.
3
There are at least two reasons why exchanges are likely to adopt policies that increase the value of
investing. One reason is to increase the number of investors and hence the demand for exchange services.
Another is to increase the amount exchange members can collect from investors through the non-linear
pricing of brokerage services.
4
One benefit provided by circuit breakers outlined by the Brady Commission is that they limit credit
risk and loss of financial confidence by providing a "time-out" during which participants can settle up and
ensure the solvency of other players. The idea that price limits, in conjunction with margin requirements,
help ensure contract performance has long been a rationale for price limits in the futures markets. Brennnan
(1986) formalized this notion. Greenwald and Stein (1989) address how "time-outs" reduce transactional
risk by allowing traders to become better informed about market liquidity. We contrast our model with that
of Greenwald and Stein below.
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rejoinder is that without coherent, coordinated circuit breakers, a disorderly market will
create its own circuit breakers in the form of clogged order delivery systems, ad hoc trading
halts, jammed communication systems, and unresponsive specialists, locals, and market
makers. Circuit breakers are seen as faciliting more orderly exchange during periods of peak
demand for exchange services.
This paper incorporates price limits and trading halts into a standard model of asset
pricing and considers whether these circuit breaker mechanisms increase efficiency. We show
that when the risk of price movements exists between the time the investor decides to trade
and the time the order is executed, i.e. during order implementation, circuit breakers may
provide for more efficient risk sharing among investors than unconstrained trade. The risk
that payoff relevant shocks (to liquidity or fundamentals) occur after an investor decides to
place an order but before the order is executed is exacerbated in periods of market stress
and is the type of risk that circuit breakers are designed to address.
Today's markets do not efficiently transfer this risk for two reasons. First, organized
markets for insurance may fail to exist.5 Second, insurance markets may be subject to the
same implementation risks as the underlying assets for which they are providing insurance.
6
Consequently insurance orders may become obsolete by the time they are executed.
7 
The
role of circuit breakers in our model is to partially insure implementation risks that are not
optimally transferred due to the absence of a complete set of markets for contingent claims.
We consider a group of investors wishing to trade futures contracts either to hedge their
endowments of an underlying asset or for purely speculative reasons.8 To keep the model
simple, we assume that investors have constant absolute risk aversion and that returns are
normally distributed. For the very reason the futures market exists (i.e. to transfer risk
among heterogeneous investors), shocks to fundamentals and liquidity that occur during
order implementation affect different investors in different ways. This fact gives rise to
potential gains from sharing implementation risk that are not exploited when contingent
claims are absent.
We first consider situations in which futures price movements are generated solely by
news about fundamentals. "Good news" about the fundamental value of the underlying
'For example, an investor who decides after Friday's close to take an agricultural futures position cannot
insure against drought information released on Sunday.
6
For example, trading a stock option, which may be used to insure against fluctuations in the value of
a cash market position, is subject to the same implementation delays during volatile times as trading the
underlying asset.
7
Hypothetically, investors who incur no delays in placing orders but who face delays in having them
executed could eliminate implementation risk by instructing their brokers how to change their orders under
every possible contingency. But as Miller (1990) points out, this would be "impossibly costly under present
or any likely foreseeable technology"(p. 11). Furthermore, investors do incur delays in placing their orders
during volatile times. For example, phone lines jammed during the October 1987 crash, so that investors
could not place their desired orders before additional information hit the market.
'Our model is simple enough to be reinterpreted as a stock market.
asset increases the endowment value of those hedgers who have positive endowments in the
underlying asset and hedge by selling short. Since good news is associated with a high futures
price, hedgers who sell futures contracts are better off when the futures price is high than
when it is low. On the other hand, good news about fundamentals reduces the endowment
value of those hedgers who have negative endowments and hedge by taking long futures
positions. Thus hedgers who buy futures contracts are better off when the futures price is
low. If contingent claims were feasible, pareto optimal insurance would transfer wealth from
sellers to buyers when price is high and from buyers to sellers when price is low. But as
noted above, contingent claims may well be infeasible.
Consider, as an alternative to contingent claims, price limits (or price contingent trading
halts) that place upper and lower bounds on the price at which investors are allowed to
trade. By artificially reducing price when the true (Walrasian) price is high, and raising
price when the true price is low, price limits transfer wealth from sellers to buyers when
price is high and from buyers to sellers when price is low. These transfers move in the
direction of welfare enhancing insurance. While the price limits involve some costs, in the
form of rationed buyers at the upper limited price and rationed sellers at the lower limited
price, the dead weight loss from rationing is of second order importance when the limits are
set wide enough. We show that when all investors are hedgers, price limits can be chosen
to yield (ex ante) pareto improving insurance. If some investors are speculators, then price
limits are pareto improving provided that investors have mean-variance utility with constant
absolute risk aversion.
We then consider the case in which price fluctuations are generated by liquidity shocks
as well as news about fundamentals. When liquidity shocks are small relative to investors'
endowments, such that each investor trades on the same side of the market (i.e. each investor
is either always long or always short) regardless of the value of the shocks, pareto superior
price limits exist. Alternatively, when liquidity shocks are large, price limits still benefit
hedgers, but they are no longer pareto improving. In this case some speculators will take
short positions when price is high and long positions when price is low. Price limits force
them to sell at lower prices when the true price is high and to buy at higher prices when the
true price is low. This reduces the speculator's wealth when price is both high and low and
therefore reduces its ex ante expected utility.
It is important to bear in mind that while price limits may increase ex ante welfare, in
our framework they necessarily reduce x post efficiency. This is because impediments to
price adjustment after information is released prevent some ex post gains from trade. Thus,
although it may be optimal to commit to price limits in advance, those market participants
who are constrained ex post may complain bitterly. In this sense price limits represent
"sand in the gears" of the Walrasian mechanism in the ex post asset market, but they may
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nevertheless improve ex ante efficiency.
In a recent paper, Greenwald and Stein (1989) also examine the usefulness of circuit
breakers. They focus on imperfections in the transaction mechanisms for executing orders
and examine the risk that investors' face between the time they have submitted an order
and its execution. In particular, they suppose that investors are uncertain as to the number
of other investors who will want to trade at the same time. They argue that to reduce
transactional risk and the associated information externalities that arise when investors
cannot anticipate the arrival of other investors, circuit breakers can provide a "time out" to
allow traders to become better informed about the response of other traders to large volume
shocks. They argue that circuit breakers may improve the Walrasian pricing mechanism
in the ex post asset market, after volume shocks have been realized, and thus should not
necessarily be interpreted as "sand in the gears."
Our approach differs from Greenwald and Stein's in two main respects. First, we evaluate
the welfare effects of price limits by evaluating investors' expected utility at the time they
decide to trade but before they know whether a price limit will be hit. Thus we address the
question of whether investors would prefer ex ante to trade in a market with price limits or
in one in which price adjustments are unconstrained.
Second, the source of the inefficiency in our model is the absence of a complete set of
contingent claims to insure against shocks that may occur during order implementation, not
information asymmetries among investors. Price limits do represent sand in the gears of the
Walrasian mechanism in the ex post asset market, but they transfer risk more efficiently
from an ex ante point of view.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 11 sets up the model and discusses the imple-
mentation risks that are the motivation for circuit breakers in our paper. In section III, we
characterize asset market equilibrium when trade is unconstrained and identify the role for
insurance in the context of implementation risk. Section IV incorporates price limits and
derives necessary and sufficient conditions for limits to increase welfare. Section V discusses
the implications, some extensions, and some caveats of our analysis. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II A Model of Implementation Risk
A critical feature of asset markets that has received little attention in the theoretical liter-
ature, but which is the main focus of our paper, is the delay incurred in carrying a trade
through to completion. While short delays are relatively innocuous when prices are stable,
they have important consequences when prices become volatile. Between the time an in-
vestor decides to place an order and the time it is actually executed, new information may
be released concerning the future value of the asset or the volume of trading activity at the
time the order is executed. This information affects the utility investors expect to receive by
participating in the market and thus introduces risk. Inefficiency arises when the potential
for transferring this risk among investors is not fully exploited. Before proceeding to the
formal model, we explore the nature of these implementation risks and motivate why they
may remain uninsured.
We distinguish two types of implementation risk associated with delays. First, transac-
tional risk concerns shocks to volume or fundamentals that lead to price adjustments between
the time orders are placed and the time they are executed. Second, initiation risk concerns
shocks to volume or fundamentals that lead to price adjustments between the time an in-
vestor decides to place an order and the time the order is placed. There are several reasons
why both risks are present, especially in volatile markets.
The most obvious reason is market closure. An investor endowed with some asset may
decide to place a new order on Saturday, based on the morning news, but not be able to place
the order or have it executed until Monday. In the meantime, information may be released
on Sunday that changes the value of the investor's endowment and the value of trading on
Monday. Typically, investors could increase their ex ante expected utilities (as of Saturday)
by trading insurance claims that would make transfers on Sunday contingent on any new
information. Absent a market on Saturday for such claims, gains from trade cannot be fully
exploited.
If market closure were the only source of transactional and initiation risks, then both risks
could be avoided with 24 hour trading. However, even when markets are open continuously,
initiation risk is still a factor for at least two reasons. First, some investors find it too costly
to stay close enough to their phones or computer terminals to be able to place orders the
instant information is released. Hence costs of monitoring the market can give rise to delays
that lead to initiation risk. Second, current technology does not allow orders to be placed
instantaneously in volatile markets, regardless of how close investors are to the market.
For example, during the October 1987 decline, phone lines jammed as too many investors
attempted to place orders at once. Such technological limitations give rise to transactional
risk as well as initiation risk. For example, on October 19, 1987 some orders were successfully
relayed to the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange but became obsolete before being
executed in the futures pit.
Initiation risk may be present even when it appears that markets are complete. Suppose
insurance claims were available, in principle allowing investors to establish ex ante pareto
optimal positions. Since buying insurance (e.g. an option) is subject to the same initiation
delays as buying or selling an asset, conditions may change before the insurance position is
established. Therefore, when initiation risk is present in every market, including insurance
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markets, it is not insurable via contingent claims.
We now formalize these ideas. Consider a three period futures market with risk averse
investors, as illustrated in figure 1. At time 0, which we refer to as ex ante, investors
contemplate allocating their portfolios between a risk free asset and a risky futures contract
that will yield a random return. Between time 0 and time 1, information is released that
gives rise to initiation risk, which we formalize shortly. At time 1 investors submit limit
orders (in the sense of their entire demand schedules) to maximize their expected utility of
terminal wealth. These orders are executed at the competitive equilibrium price or limited
futures price without delay. Thus we ignore transactional risk in our formal presentation
in order to focus on initiation risk. We return to transactional risk in section V. At time 2
the (random) terminal spot market price V of the underlying asset is determined, and the
futures contract expires. We refer to times 1 and 2 as the ex post asset market.
We now present the information structure of our model and the formalization of initi-
ation risk. At time 0, when investors contemplate taking futures positions, their common
expectation of the terminal spot market price of the underlying asset is v, and investor i's
expectation of its terminal endowment is i6;. The (fixed) parameter 0; can be interpreted
as the cash market position that investor i wishes to hedge (where a positive value of 0;
indicates, a long position and a negative value indicates a short position). For example, a
producer of grain has a positive endowment while a firm that uses grain in production has
a negative endowment. Alternatively, 0, may simply reflect how investor i's future profit or
wealth depends on the future value of the underlying asset.'
Between time 0 and time 1, news about fundamentals is released that induces investors to
update their expectations of the terminal spot price to n + P and their terminal endowments
to (n+ ±+)0.. This news is uninsured and represents a source of initiation risk. For simplicity
we assume that n E {-e,0, e} (e > 0) and that positive and negative shocks to fundamentals
each occur with equal probability fl,,.'o
In addition to uncertainty regarding news releases, investors are also uncertain as to the
volume of trading activity at time 1. We model this additional source of initiation risk as
a random liquidity shock s E {-p,0,p} (p ;> 0) between time 0 and time 1 where s is the
number of short positions taken by liquidity traders. We assume that positive and negative
supply shocks occur with equal probability /,. For simplicity we assume that s and nt are
independently distributed.
To close the model, we assume that at time 2 the terminal spot price is determined as V =
n+v, where E(vls,n) = P. Since the futures and spot prices are equal at contract expiration,
9 Under this interpretation the linear dependence of the value of the endowment on v is restrictive, but
this assumption allows us to generate our main insights within a tractable model.
t
Assuming a continuous distribution for n results in the same insights but adds unneeded complexity to
the model.
the futures contract expires at the price V. Finally, we make assumptions that justify the
linear mean-variance certainty equivalence approach. We assume that conditional on n and
s, v is normally distributed with variance Q2, and investor i has a negative exponential utility
function U;(W;) = -e,,Wi where W, is investor i's terminal wealth and y= is its coefficient
of absolute risk aversion.
III No Circuit Breakers
In this section we begin by characterizing the futures market equilibrium in the absence of
circuit breakers. We then consider the extent to which risk sharing opportunities are left
unexploited in the presence of initiation risk.
To facilitate the evaluation of investors' ex ante expected utility, it proves convenient to
examine their certainty equivalent values of participating in the market at time 1. Investor
i's certainty equivalent at time 1 is the amount of money the investor would accept at time 1
for his endowment and the ability to trade at time 1. Since this is an increasing function of
expected utility at time 1, choosing a futures position to maximize the certainty equivalent
is the same as choosing a position to maximize expected utility.
Under the assumption of normal returns and negative exponential utility, investor i's
certainty equivalent is given by
Ci(x;,,P, n) = E,,(Wi(xi, P, n, v)) - iVari (W(xi,P,n,v))
2
where P is the futures price, Wi(x;, P,n, v) = PO;+(n+v - P)(0i+x;) is i's terminal wealth,
and E, and Vary, are the expectation and variance operators with respect to the distribution
of v." Choosing a futures position, xi, to maximize C; yields an optimal position for investor
n +v - (Y 'y;0, -P
7i2
Setting aggregate net futures demand equal to zero, E;j x(P, n)-s = 0, yields the competitive
equilibrium futures price
P*(s, n)=n+v-a A(s) (1)
where
Eg o;+sA(s) = 1 +.
Ei I
1'This model can be interpreted as a simple stock market by assuming that the cash market supply is
sC = 1 + s (where expected supply is normalized to 1) and xi is the additional amount of stock purchased
by investor i.
"We assume that investors' endowments in the risk free security are large enough that interior solutions
characterize their optimal futures positions.
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Substituting P* into the equations for x and C; yields investor i's competitive equilibrium
position
X;(s A(s - 60
and its equilibrium certainty equivalent
C7(s,n) = (nt + v - oA(s))0+; + 27; .
(2)
(3)
At time 0 investor i'cares about the expected utility of C; (s,n) over all realizations of the
liquidity shock s and the news term n. These shocks affect the certainty equivalent through
their effects on the value of the endowment and the expected value of the equilibrium position.
The first term in equation (3) is the value of investor i's endowment as of time 1. The second
term is the value of investor i's equilibrium position.
The effect of news about fundamentals on the value of investor i's endowment depends
on whether the endowment is positive or negative. For example, an increase in the expected
cash price (n positive) would reduce the certainty equivalent if the endowment were negative.
However, news about fundamentals does not affect the value of investor i's equilibrium
position. This is a result of the fact that investor i's net futures demand is a function of n-P.
Therefore, the value n - P is determined in equilibrium as a function of s. Consequently,
the equilibrium price adjusts one-for-one to reflect fully any news about fundamentals, and
investor i's position is unaffected by the news.
Fluctuations in liquidity affect investor i's certainty equivalent by altering both the value
of the endowment and the value of the equilibrium position. Differentiating C, with re-
spect to s yields aC, /8s = A'(s)u [(A(s)/yi) -] = oix;(s)/ (1/y,), which is positive if
and only if x;(s) is positive. Hence, an increase in supply benefits investors who take long
positions, since they can buy at a lower price, but hurts sellers who must sell at a lower
price.
We now examine the extent to which risk sharing possibilities concerning s and n are
left unexploited. Pareto optimal risk sharing would entail state contingent transfers, T(s,n)
(which may be positive or negative), from each investor j $ i to investor i so as to equate
marginal rates of substitution across states of nature. That is, transfers would be chosen so
that for all j $i, s, s', n, and n'
U (C:(s,7n) + EZ7 ; T(s, n)) - Uj (C;(s,n) - T(s, n))
U: (C:(s',n') + EZ&;T(s',n')) Uj (C';(s',n') - T(s',n'))
where U = aUi/OCi. Using the negative exponential utility function, substituting for C,
and C! from equation (3), and rearranging, this expression becomes
(7;6; - j0)[n' - n + cQ (A(s) - A(s'))] = (7; + gj)[Tj(s, n) - Tj(s', n')]
+ 7 E [T(s, n) - T(s', n')) . (4)
Equation (4) is the necessary and sufficient condition for pareto optimal sharing of initiation
risk.
Observe from (4) that if state contingent transfers are infeasible (Tk = 0 Vk), then risk
sharing is pareto optimal if and only if y;D; = 7jO3 Vj # i. But using the expression for the
value of investors' equilibrium positions in equation (2), this would imply that 7,x; = 7jx,
or that every investor would want to take a position on the same side of the futures market.
If this were true, the futures market would cease to exist. We therefore have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose an active futures market exists. Then if ex post transfers cannot be
conditioned on shocks to liquidity and fundamentals that occur during order initiation, there
are potential (ex ante) gains from sharing initiation risk that are not exploited.
Intuitively, if there are gains from transferring risk among heterogeneous investors in the
futures market, then there also will be potential gains from transferring initiation risk.
IV Circuit Breakers
When markets for contingent- claims fail to exist, investors may seek alternative means to
insure initiation risk. This section incorporates circuit breakers into the model to examine
how they can partially insure initiation risk. We begin by describing some of the price limits
and trading halts employed by stock and futures exchanges before and after the October 1987
market decline. We then model the effects of these circuit breakers and derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for welfare to increase when they are employed. For cases in which
welfare does not increase, we determine the types of traders who benefit and lose from
circuit breakers.
Most commodity futures exchanges have historically employed daily price limits con-
straining the maximum upward and downward price movements allowed over the course of a
given trading day. More recently, following the 1987 market decline, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) adopted a 3-tier system of price limits constraining upward and downward
movements of the S&P 500 futures price over different lengths of time during different times
of the day. The first tier requires the prices to be within 5 S&P points of the previous day's
close. If the price reaches the 5- point limit before 10 minutes elapses, then trading can
continue at or within the 5-point bound. If the price is at the limit 10 minutes after the
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open, then trading is halted for two minutes, and a new price is established after the halt
by open outcry. The second tier establishes a lower limit 12 points below the previous day's
close for 30 minutes or until 2:30 PM Chicago time, whichever comes first. The third tier
establishes limits 20 points above and 20 points below the previous day's close. The 20-point
limit acts as a "traditional" daily limit (in the sense that trading may continue if price is
within the 20-point bound) unless trading has been halted on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), in which case trading is also halted on the futures exchange for the same duration.
The NYSE circuit breakers take the form of price-contingent trading halts. If the Dow
Jones Industrial average declines by 250 points, trading in all stocks halts for 1 hour. If the
Dow falls by another 150 points after reopening, trading is halted for another 2 hours.
In our simple static framework, we model both price limits and trading halts as a single
tier of upper and lower bounds on the price at which investors are allowed to trade.'3 Al-
though the static model does not allow us to address the rationale for the multi-tier structure
of the circuit breaker mechanisms cited above, we believe that our framework nevertheless
yields important insights about the welfare effects of circuit breakers.
Formally, suppose price limits increase price in the lowest price state by L and reduce
it in the highest price state by aL where a > 0. The parameter a represents the relative
amount limits are reduced at the upper limited price for any increase in the lower limited
price. Setting a = 0 would imply the absence of an upper bound, as seen, for example, in
the second tier of the limits on the S&P 500 contract and both tiers of the NYSE trading
halts.
We will examine the effects of locally tightening the price limit policy by increasing L
from zero. When a > 0, a small increase in L from zero causes limits to bind only in the
highest and lowest price states. Recall that the high price state corresponds to a negative
liquidity shock and positive fundamentals shock, (s, n) = (-p, e), and the low price state
corresponds to the opposite shocks, (s, n) = (p, -e). To economize on notation in what
follows, we use the superscripts h and a to represent the high price and low price states
respectively; henceforth we suppress s and n from the notation and use these superscripts
whenever they cause no confusion. Following this convention, when price limits are imposed,
the futures price is given by
ph(a, L) = P(-;t, e) - aL if (s, n) = (-p, 6)
Pe(L) = P*(i, -e) + L if (s, n) = (p, -c), and
P*(s, n) otherwise.
"While, price limits typically allow trades to occur at the upper and lower bounds, trading halts shut
down trade altogether. In our static framework, however, the mechanisms are equivalent if as many orders
as possible are filled before trade is halted. In fact, specialists on the NYSE are instructed to maintain an
orderly market by filling orders to the extent possible before they halt trade.
When the upper price limit is reached, the demand for futures contracts exceeds the
supply, and when the lower limit is reached, supply exceeds demand. Thus to evaluate the
effects of limits on investors we need to address how buyers are rationed at the upper limit
and how sellers are rationed at the lower limit. At this point we assume that when the upper
limit is reached, total supply, xs = E{il h(ph)<o) x"(Ph), is rationed across buyers according
to a fixed and deterministic rule whose properties we specify below. Similarly, when the
lower limit is reached, total demand, xB = Ei{ig(pg)>o) x(Pt), is rationed across sellers
according to a fixed and deterministic rule. In section V we show that our results continue
to hold when investors are rationed on a first-come-first-serve basis.
To formalize the deterministic rationing rule, let y (a, L) <x; be the rationed position
of buyer i at the upper limited price, and let yf(L) > x be the rationed position of seller i at
the lower limited price. We make the following assumptions on the rationing rule. When L
equals zero, no investor is rationed; i.e., for all a, y; (a,0) = x; and y4(0) = x. For any given
(a, L), the rationed positions of buyers sum to the total amount supplied, and the rationed
position of sellers sum to the total amount demanded; i.e., E{ixh(ph)>o) y;'(a, L) = xs and
Ei{:j(Po)<O} y(L) = XB. Finally, we assume that y; and y;4 are continuously differentiable
and that for all a, the derivitives 8y'(a, 0)/8L and By;(0)/8L are finite. This implies that
rationing is "fair" in the sense that each investor's position changes at a finite rate as the
price limits are tightened.
Below we will calculate the effects on investor i of locally tightening the limits by differ-
entiating ex ante expected utility with respect to L and evaluating the resulting expression
at L = 0. Since this will require knowing how the certainty equivalents at the upper and
lower limits are affected by L, we calculate and interpret these derivatives now for later use.
The limited value of investor i's certainty equivalent at the lower limit is equal to
C (y;(L), P'(L)). Differentiating with respect to L and evaluating at L = 0 gives
d f (y;, P') BCf (y., Pt) Byt Cf (14, Pt)9 p'
dL 8x; L + 8P LL=O L-0
S{oCf(x,P)aye + cf(x;, P) apI







Equation (6) uses the fact that investors are not rationed when L = 0, i.e., y(0) = X.
Equation (7) uses the facts that Cf/9x; = 0, by the first order condition for optimal
behavior, By;/aL is finite, by the fair rationing assumption, Cf /OP = -4, by the envelope
theorem, and OP'/OL = 1.
Equation (8) intuitively means that a local increase of dL in the lower limited price
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reduces investor i's certainty equivalent by dL times the amount of its net futures position.'"
In the aggregate, this transfers xBdL units of wealth from buyers to sellers. Since all the
wealth transferred from buyers goes to sellers, there is no "deadweight loss" from rationing
when the limits just begin to bind.
Similar reasoning can be used to determine how C; is affected by local changes in L.




Equation (9) implies that in the aggregate, locally tightening the limits transfers axzdL
from sellers to buyers when the futures price is high. Again, since the transfers are complete,
there is no deadweight loss from a small change in L at L = 0.
We are now ready to examine the effects of locally tightening the limits on investor i's ex
ante expected utility. Under the assumption that s and n are independent, ,/,, =Prob{High
Price State}=Prob{Low Price State}. Since the limits affect the certainty equivalent only
in limited states, a local increase in L from L = 0 changes buyer i's ex ante expected utility
by
dEUg (Ci) -0n dC dC
dL dL dL = O
= #,#3 (U(C)ax' - U,(Cf)x)
(10)
(11)
Cf < Ch, and dE8,,U,(C;)/dL is again greater than zero by the concavity of U;. Hence,
tightening the limits increases the ex ante expected utility of both buyers and sellers. Since
this result emerges as a special case of Proposition 2 below, we state it as a corollary here.
Corollary 1 Suppose that fluctuations in the futures price are due entirely to news about
fundamentals. Then a symmetric (a = 1) local tightening of the limits increases the ex
ante expected utility of those investors who trade solely to hedge their endowments of the
underlying asset. If all investors are hedgers, then there exist price limits that are pareto
superior to unconstrained trade.
Despite critics' claims that circuit breakers represent sand in the gears of the (ex post)
Walrasian mechanism, Corollary 1 demonstrates that establishing price limits before volatile
times occur can increase investors' ex ante expected utility. The intuition is straightforward.
When limits are tightened symmetrically, a local increase in L transfers x'dL units of wealth
from the sellers to buyer i when price is high, and it transfers xfdL = zxdL units of wealth
from buyer i to the sellers when price is low. Since the high and low prices are equally
likely, and since buyers are better off when the futures price is low, these transfers reduce
the variance of buyer i's random wealth across news realizations without changing the mean.
In the discrete distribution formulation of the liquidity and news shocks that we consider,
this is sufficient for buyer i's ex ante expected utility to increase. A similar intuition holds
for sellers of futures contracts.
We have highlighted the pure-hedging and no-liquidity-shock case because it is the most
intuitive. However price limits are pareto improving for a wider class of cases. To see this
we examine more carefully how investor i's ex ante expected utility depends on L.
Rearranging (11) yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for a local increase
in L to increase investor i's expected utility:
dE.,,nU,(C) > 0
dL
U'(C! )x' dP' > 1 >if and only if M;= U(C )x dPe < asx >0. (12)
For a buyer in the low price state (x; > 0), M1 is the amount the buyer is willing to pay, in
terms of an increase in the low price, for an equal reduction in the high price. The parameter
1/a is the amount the buyer actually pays, in terms of an increase in the low price, for a
reduction in the high price. The buyer benefits from a local tightening of the limits if the
buyer is willing to accept a greater increase in the low price for a reduction in the high price
than is required, as reflected by the upper set of inequalities in condition (12). For a seller
in the low price state (x; < 0), M; is the amount the seller is willing to accept, in terms of
where equation (11) makes use of the expressions for dC!'/dL and dCf /dL in equations (8)
and (9).
We can use equation (11) to determine the welfare effects of price limits in the simplest
case, which results when investment occurs solely for hedging purposes and price movements
are due entirely to news about fundamentals. In this case sellers hedge their positive endow-
ments and buyers hedge their negative endowments. Sellers are better off when the futures
price is high, which corresponds to good news about their endowments, and buyers are better
off when the price is low, which corresponds to bad news about their endowments. When
there are no liquidity shocks, p = 0, and investor i's equilibrium position, A(0)/y, - 0,, is
the same in both the high and low price states; i.e. x' = x;.
Now consider the effects of a tightening the limits by the same amount (a = 1) at the
upper and lower limited prices. Suppose first that hedger i is a buyer. Then, since x'=
x; > 0 and Cf >C, , equation (11) becomes dE.,,,Ui(C;)/dL = #,#,x![U(C ) - lU(Cf)] >0,
by the concavity of U,. That is, a symmetric local tightening of the limits increases investor
i's ex ante expected utility. Alternatively suppose investor i is a seller. 'Ihei x' = 4 < 0,
"This result is simply an extension of Roy's Law to a portfolio choice problem in which the marginal
certainty equivalent of wealth equals one.
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an increase in the low price, for a reduction in the high price. 1/a is the increase in the low
price that the seller actually receives for a reduction in the high price. The seller benefits
from a local tightening of the limits if the seller is willing to accept a smaller increase in
the low price for a reduction in the high price than the amount required, as reflected by the
lower set of inequalities in condition (12).
A local tightening of the limits is pareto improving if and only if there exists an a such
that condition (12) holds for every investor i. Let the subscript iB refer to a buyer at the low
price and is a seller at the low price. Putting the inequalities in condition (12) together to
isolate 1/a gives the following condition for pareto improving price limits: A local increase
in L (from 0) is pareto improving if and only if, for every buyer, iB, and every seller, is,
M=S < -< MI.a
(13)
Substituting for the equilibrium certainty equivalents from equation (3), using the negative
exponential utility function, and recognizing that we are free to choose any a satisfying (13),
condition (13) becomes
Mi = Ke-2m'sessa2I+<{ A(-pa) -7,;O < Ie-2.Be. Blc7++e {A(-p) - 1,0;" =
A(p) - i,0i, )A(p) 180- , J8 '
(14)
for every buyer at the low price, iB, and every seller at the low price, is, where K =
exp{2op E O,/ Ej,(1/_yi)}. We now give the formal conditions for pareto superior limits in
the presence of shocks to both news and liquidity.
Proposition 2 Suppose that each investor i takes a position that is either always long or
always short, regardless of the value of shocks to liquidity and fundamentals. That is, ViB, is,
7;,0;, < A(-pi) < A(p) < -y;0;,. Then there exist price limits that are pareto superior to
unconstrained trade. On the other hand, if some investor iB sells futures at the upper limited
price and buys futures at the lower limited price (A(-p) < y ,0;, < A(p)), then a local
increase in L from zero is not pareto improving.
Proof: Suppose first that buyers always buy and sellers always sell. That is, yiBeiB <
A(-p) < A(p) < -;,0;s. Then Mi, and Me,, are both positive in condition (14). It is easy
to verify that Mi is strictly decreasing in -;i;. Since -yiB0;B < yi,0;,, it follows that condition
(14) is satisfied. Hence pareto superior price limits exist in this case.
Next suppose that some speculator buys when price is low and sells when price is high.
For this speculator, MAB is negative since A(-pi) < 7iBOiB < A(p). Since M;, is positive
(because any investor is who sells at the low price will also sell at the high price, i.e.,
A(-p) < A(p) < ryi0;,), condition (14) cannot be satisfied. Ience a local tightening of the
limits is not pareto improving. Q.E.D.
Several interesting corollaries follow from Proposition 2. Corollary 1, which stated that
pareto superior price limits exist in the pure-hedging and no-liquidity-shock case, follows
from the fact that hedgers each take positions on the same side of the market in order to
offset their endowed positions. Since this is true whether liquidity shocks are present or
absent, the no-liquidity-shock requirement is superfluous when investors are hedgers. This
gives Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 There exist price limits that increase the ex ante expected utility of every
hedger. Hence if all investors are hedgers, then there exist price limits that are pareto superior
to unconstrained trade.
On the other hand, suppose that some investors are speculators, in the sense that their
optimal positions do not offset their endowments, and that there are no liquidity shocks
(p = 0). Then, since x; = xi = A(0)/Y; - 0; Vi, each investor always takes a position on the
same side of the market. We therefore have the following.
Corollary 3 Suppose that price movements are due entirely to news about fundamentals.
Then there exist price limits that are pareto superior to unconstrained trade.
Corollary 3 implies that even if some investors trade for purely speculative reasons,
judiciously chosen price limits are pareto improving provided there are no liquidity shocks.
When fluctuations in price are due solely to news about fundamentals, sellers have lower
marginal rates of substitution between price decreases in the high and low price states than
buyers. Thus, a can be chosen high enough that a reduction of adL in the upper price
benefits each buyer by more than an increase of dL in the lower price, yet low enough that
the reduction in the upper price harms sellers by less than they benefit from the increase in
the lower price.
The final case of interest, already described in Proposition 2, occurs when liquidity shocks
are large enough to induce a speculator to buy when price is low and sell when price is high.
It is easy to see that a local tightening of the limits is not pareto improving in this case.
Price limits require such a speculator to sell at a lower price when price is high and buy at
a higher price when price is low. This decreases the speculator's time 1 certainty equivalent
both when price is high and low and therefore reduces ex ante expected utility.
V Implications and Extensions
Although we have not characterized the optimal price limits that satisfy specific objectives,
we have shown that investors can benefit from price limits that constrain both upward and
downward price movements. In general, futures exchanges employ limits that allow equal
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upward and downward movements in price. This is consistent with Proposition 2, which
demonstrates that symmetric limits make hedgers better off when price movements are due
entirely to news about fundamentals.
In the stock market, we observe only lower limits. In our model this corresponds to
a = 0. To see when the model is consistent with lower limits alone, recall the necessary and
sufficient condition (13) for locally tightening the limits to be pareto improving:
1
M, < - <MiB.
a
As a approaches 0, 1/a approaches infinity. Thus lower limits alone are pareto improving
only when all investors are sellers. In the futures market, all investors cannot be sellers, since
the market would cease to exist. In the stock market, however, the presence of a specialist
theoretically enables all other investors to sell to the specialist. Thus, if the specialist's
welfare is ignored, then lower limits alone could be welfare enhancing."
A common criticism of price limits is that limited or "stale" prices fail to convey all
available information to investors. Note that in our model, the limited prices fully reveal
the news shock. This is true because we consider limits that bind only in the highest and
lowest price states; such limits are associated with particular values of the news. This will
be true of any model in which the liquidity and news shocks have discrete distributions and
price limits bind in the highest and lowest price states. While optimally chosen price limits
may be tighter, and hence the limited prices may fail to convey all information, this criticism
does not negate our results establishing when limits are pareto improving.
We have assumed that when prices reach a limit, investors are rationed according a
deterministic rule. A more realistic assumption might be that investors' orders are filled in
the order that they arrive. As we show in the appendix, none of our results are altered when
investors are rationed on a first-come first-serve basis. The intuition is similar to that in
the proportional rationing case. A local increase of dL in the lower limited price (at L = 0)
transfers xidL from buyers to sellers. There is no deadweight loss since the marginal seller,
whose order arrives last, is not rationed when L = 0. Similarly, a local decrease in the upper
limited price transfers axzdL from sellers to buyers without any deadweight loss. These
transfers are pareto improving according to the conditions we have already established. Of
course, in practice limits may be chosen tight enough that some buyers (sellers) are rationed
completely out of the market at he upper (lower) limited price. Nevertheless, we only need
"Inequality (13) is inappropriate for analyzing the stock market when there are no liquidity shocks and
investors' endowments are chosen optimally in the period prior to the release of news. For then no change
in the investor's position is desired (i.e. xr = x! = 0) since investor i's competitive equilibrium position is
independent of the news (see section III), and hence M; is undefined. However it is clear that (non-local)
lower limits increase the welfare of sellers by allowing them to sell stock to the specialist at artificially high
prices.
to consider local changes in L at L = 0 to demonstrate whether some set of price limits is
pareto improving.
We ignored transactional risk, which arises when shocks occur between the time orders
are submitted and the time they are executed. Allowing for transactional risk exacerbates
the efficiency problem in two ways. When it arises from liquidity shocks, it simply worsens
the ex ante inefficiency that we have identified. When transactional risk arises from news
shocks, it creates inefficiency in the ex post asset market by making the orders submitted
prior to the news release sub-optimal by the time they are executed. We ignored transactional
risk, and the associated ex post inefficiency, in order to focus on ex ante inefficiency. In our
setting, price limits cannot provide insurance for news about fundamentals that is released
after investors' orders are submitted but before they are executed.
Assuming that investors' preferences are important in determining price limit policy,
our model suggests conditions under which limits are more or less likely to be used. Since
judiciously chosen price limits benefit hedgers, we are more likely to see price limits when
hedgers dominate the market. Similarly, we are more likely to see price limits used when price
movements are driven largely by news about fundamentals. However, when the variance of
liquidity shocks is large and induces a large number of speculators to buy when price is low
and sell when price is high, then the harmful effects of limits for these investors may preclude
their use.
An interesting extension of our model would be to solve for optimal price limits under
alternative assumptions about the exchange's objectives. This might generate testable pre-
dictions concerning how "optimal" price limits vary with parameters such as the variance of
liquidity shocks, the variance of news, the risk aversion of investors, the number of hedgers
and speculators, etc.
Another interesting extension would consider how circuit breakers should be coordinated
across stock and futures markets. Competing exchanges may choose their price limit policies
to attract investors. It would be interesting to consider whether some futures exchanges
choose different policies than stock exchanges and other futures exchanges and whether
requiring coordinated circuit breakers would be beneficial.
We view our static model as a first attempt at examining the effects of price limits and
trading halts. Important dynamic issues were ignored that may be fruitful areas for further
research.
Investors with long horizons may be inclined to wait-out price limits until they are no
longer in effect. For example, when the lower limited price is reached, investors planning to
hedge by buying and holding may choose to wait for tomorrow's price if they expect it to be
lower. Our model abstracts from this possibility by assuming a single trading period.
Another limitation of the static model is that price limits and trading halts are treated
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identically. While they are equivalent in our static framework, provided that as many orders
as possible are executed before trade is halted, it may well be that some orders on both sides
of the market arrive after trade is halted. This may induce investors to alter their orders in
different ways depending on whether they anticipate a trading halt or a price limit. These
issues can only be addressed in a dynamic framework.
VI Conclusion
Recent proponents of circuit breakers as a means to "cushion the impact of market move-
ments..." and "protect markets and investors,"'
6 have met frequent criticism from free
market advocates who view asset markets as efficient. The efficiency argument rests on the
assumption that orders are initiated and executed without delay. During periods of volatile
price movements, however, delays, both in initiating and executing orders, appear to be
widespread. We argue that such delays give rise to implementation risk that cannot be
transferred optimally among investors; hence, even when the market is ex post efficient, it
may nevertheless be ex ante inefficient.
We examine the case in which investors have constant absolute risk aversion and returns
are normally distributed. We show that price limits and trading halts can serve to partially
insure implementation risk and in some cases are pareto superior to unconstrained trade.
One such case is when price movements are due entirely to news regarding fundamentals. In
this case price limits provide pareto improving transfers of wealth across realizations of the
news in such a way as to "smooth" each investor's wealth.
When shocks are due to both fundamentals and liquidity, price limits are pareto improving
when each investor is either always a buyer or always a seller regardless of the nature of the
shocks. This condition holds when all investors are hedgers or when liquidity shocks are
small enough that no speculators choose to buy at low prices and sell at high prices. If some
speculators prefer to buy at low prices and sell at high prices, price limits will not benefit
this set of investors and thus will be pareto inferior to unconstrained trade.
It is not surprising that "second best" (self) regulation, such as price limits and trading
halts, can improve market performance when a complete set of contingent claims is absent.
Perhaps other exchange-imposed impediments to mutually advantageous trade are motivated
by risk inherent in the trading process.
APPENDIX
This appendix shows that all of our results continue to hold when investors are rationed
according to the arrival of their orders.
Consider first the rationing of buyers at the upper limited price. Suppose that buyers'
orders arrive randomly and are filled in the order that they arrive. When L is small, the
probability that buyer i is the marginal buyer, who is rationed, is equal to qa =1/(Total
Number of buyers). At the lower limited price buyers are not rationed. Since the limits
affect investors only in the highest and lowest price states, a local increase in L from L = 0
changes buyer i's ex ante expected utility by
dE U-(C ) d dC ~dE ( ) 1 - )U(C)*dC+ + BU(Ch)dC* + U(C) (15)
dL) ' +dL dLdL
= .,, (U,(C)aXI - U; (Cf)x) (16)
Equation (15) uses the fact that when L = 0, buyer i's certainty equivalent is the same
whether he is rationed or not. Equation (16) uses the expressions for dC,'/dL and dCf/dL
in equations (8) and (9).
Expression (16) is identical to expression (11) in the main body of the paper, and a similar
expression holds for sellers. Since all of our results in the paper follow from manipulations of
expression (11), they continue to hold when investors are rationed according to the arrival
of their orders.
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In our model, we ignore transactional risk in order to focus on initiation risk. Thus, the timing in
our model is as follows:
Initiation Risk Transactional Risk (ignored)
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